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November 26, 2003
Bursting the Constitutional Bubble
So why does the EU need a Constitution anyway? The question arises again out of the growing unease with Valery Giscard d'Estaing's 265-page treaty. This week, the U.K. and Estonia added their voices
to the ranks of potential dissenters. Along with Spain and Poland, who have been playing the spoilers almost alone up till now, a growing (albeit still small) number of countries are beginning to ask, as James Brown
did of war: What is it good for?
Different member states have different reasons for disliking the document, and some of those reasons are more sensible than others. Estonia's insistence, for example, that
every country always have a seat in the European Commission seems ill-conceived. As one accession-country diplomat recently put it to us, do Europe's small countries really want a guaranteed seat at the commission
if that seat is almost certain to be "commissioner for feline affairs"? Far better perhaps to take their turns on the commission but maintain the chance of controlling a truly important position than to
settle for a make-work portfolio. Besides, liberal Estonia, of all countries, should appreciate that more commissioners means more regulation, a bigger budget, and more bureaucrats looking for ways to make
themselves relevant.
But more interesting than the particular objections is the growing sense around Europe, embodied in the statement earlier this week out of Tony Blair's government that the constitution is
"highly desirable" but not "necessary." With those words -- "not necessary" -- a bubble of sorts may have been punctured in Brussels. The substance of Prime Minister Blair's warning
that he would not give on Britain's so-called red line issues -- such as opposition to tax harmonization -- may be dismissed as domestic posturing. Despite the ardent wishes expressed by Prime Minister Guy
Verhofstadt, the constitution never foresaw a change in the EU's role in tax policy anyway. But the change in tone is noteworthy because it adds a "big country" voice to those suggesting that there is no
inevitability surrounding this document.
The rhetoric around European integration has traditionally been wrapped in an aura of historical necessity. When Ireland voted down the Nice Treaty, it was told in no
uncertain terms that its three million voters would not be permitted to stand in the way of European history, and that a "No" vote was simply unacceptable -- they would have to try again, which they did.
The fact that Nice is now seen as a failed treaty that has made the constitution the new (supposed) necessity only adds insult to the injury of forcing the Irish to change their answer on Nice. It suggests that
maybe they had a point after all, whatever their sundry (and sometimes quirky) reasons for voting no in the first place. Indeed, should the constitution come into force in a timely fashion, most of what was decided
at Nice will become a dead letter before its provisions ever become effective.
But Nice may see the light of day after all, now that Poland and Spain, and now Estonia and the U.K. have all given indications
that if they are not happy with the proposed new EU, they'll stick with the one they've got, thank you very much. This trend, if it continues, is dangerous for the constitution's prospects, since the EU's tyranny of
consensus has so often been held together by the specter that there was no alternative to accepting what had already been worked out in advance by "everyone else."
That this sort of arm-twisting has
often served in the place of actual persuasion is an uncomfortable truth in Brussels, but it's a bluff that at least some countries now seem willing to call. In his piece, Prime Minister Verhofstadt makes the
opposing case, arguing for both the inevitably and desirability of a "federal" Europe, one whose powers are "being expanded continually."
It's worth noting here that preserving the EU's
"freedom to act" is only an unalloyed good if one accepts the premise of the inevitably and desirability of continual "deepening" of the EU. The EU could do more good by doing less, reducing the
number of areas in which it intrudes and limiting itself to maintaining and strengthening an internal market in which goods, people, jobs and services are able to move freely. That doesn't require federalism, just a
streamlined EU with clearly defined goals and a limited remit.
Of course, the objections being raised to the constitution by Poland, Spain, Estonia and the U.K. don't yet go this far; they are themselves
narrowly tailored to national interests. But if in the process they puncture the aura of inevitability behind which the integrationists hide, it will make a good start.
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